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 KEY CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS CONFRONTING SMALLHOLDER,
AGRIBUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT  LEADERS  IN 
  ZAMBIA’S COTTON SECTOR
BACKGROUND:  Since the initiation of major
agricultural reforms in the early 1990s, Zambian
cotton production and processing has grown
rapidly and now ranks as one of the most
important sources of crop income among small
farmers and agribusiness firms in key agricultural
production regions of the country. 
A Cotton Industry Consultative Meeting,
convened by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food
and Fisheries (MAFF) and the Agricultural
Consultative Forum, was held in Lusaka in
October 1999 and again in February 2000 to
discuss current problems and challenges facing the
cotton industry.  The meetings brought together
representatives of farmers’ groups, assemblers,
ginners, the research and extension system, and
MAFF officials.  Based on these meetings and
independent analysis, the Food Security Research
Project prepared a study that identified underlying
causes of the current crisis facing the industry and
proposed a set of actions for the industry to
consider and resolve to promote the interests of
smallholder and agribusiness development in
Zambia.
OBJECTIVES:   This policy brief highlights
some of the key messages contained in the full
report.
1  However the problems and opportunities
facing the industry are very complex, and cannot
be easily summarized in this brief.  Hence one
goal of this policy brief is to encourage interested
parties to obtain, review and debate the full study.
A second objective of this brief is to highlight the
strategic industry development questions and
proposals identified in the study that require
debate and follow up actions.  
CHALLENGES FACING INDUSTRY AND
GOVERNMENT LEADERS:  Cotton
production in Zambia has doubled since the
dismantling of the cotton parastatal Lintco and the
introduction of outgrower programs supported by
private agribusiness firms in the mid 1990s.  In
spite of these achievements, the cotton sector has
in the past two years been plunged into crisis.
Four key challenges underlying the current
problems facing the cotton industry are:
1. How Zambia’s cotton sector can sustain
and build upon its success story and
remain competitive in the face of a
projected long-term decline in world
cotton prices as well as shorter price
cycles; 
2. How cotton pricing can be made more
transparent and less uncertain for farmers;
3. How can agribusiness firms supply inputs
and extension support to smallholder
farmers to achieve productivity growth
while addressing ginners’ and other
firms’ problems with farmer loan
repayment.
4. How the cotton industry can finance
investments in agricultural research and
extension systems needed to achieve
long-run productivity growth in an
environment where the public sector is
not likely to provide these investments.
1 Improving Smallholder And Agri-business
Opportunities in Zambia’s Cotton Sector:  Key
Challenges and Options.  Working Paper No. 1.  Food
Security Research Project, Lusaka, Zambia.
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PROBLEM DIAGNOSIS AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INDUSTRY:
Discussions at the Consultative Meeting and
findings in the study highlight several key points
that should frame debate about the cotton
industry’s future in Zambia:
First, in light of the government’s limited ability
to finance investments that are necessary to
promote the productivity of Zambian cotton
farmers and agribusiness firms, it is clear that the
cotton industry — ginners, farmers, and
everyone in-between — needs to organize itself
and develop a framework for addressing its
problems in which all parties are invested,
seeking only strategic  facilitating and regulatory
assistance from government.
Second, using Post Harvest Survey data now
available, it is clear that there are key differences
between  as well as among  smallholders growing
cotton and those not growing cotton.  Compared
to farmers not growing cotton, cotton farmers in
Zambia cultivate about twice as much land, are
substantially more likely to use animal traction,
and also grow more maize.  While 70% of the
cotton growers received inputs on credit, only 2%
of the non-cotton growers did.  It is not clear
whether cotton provided a vehicle for these
households to accumulate more draft power and
land, or whether it was the better-equipped farmers
that have gotten into cotton in the first place, or
some mutually reinforcing process.  Whatever the
case, cotton cultivation does not appear to have a
negative effect on staple food production.  The
Post Harvest Survey needs to be utilized more
extensively to provide a clearer picture of farmer
behavior to guide industry development plans.
Third, excess ginning capacity is a key
contributor to the current loan recovery debacle.
There are major scale economies in cotton
ginning.  As long as functioning ginning capacity
remains 40% or more above production, there will
be incentives for ginners and their agents to
purchase cotton from farmers supported by other
firms, unless a mediated framework -- with teeth --
is developed.  If the underlying problems leading
to the current poaching/loan default problem could
be redressed, agribusiness firms would have the
incentives again to continue expanding the cotton
production base through outgrower arrangements.
Fourth, a rise in total cotton production will
reduce industry processing costs and is likely to
result in higher prices for farmers.  Achieving
production levels more in line with current
ginning capacity would reduce ginning costs,
which could partially be passed on to farmers in
the form of higher prices, which would in turn
stimulate even greater production.  Ginners and
farmers are in a symbiotic relationship in which
both groups require adequate incentives and
profitability to maintain the industry’s viability.
The mutual recognition of this symbiotic
relationship will form the incentive for an
industry-wide framework as proposed in Point 1.
Fifth, dealing with fewer actors in the
production process may help reduce the costs
that outgrower firms incur in providing inputs
and recovering in-kind loans.  The loan recovery
problem is fundamentally a cost problem: it is
prohibitively expensive for cotton companies to
monitor the behavior of each and every
smallholder producer to whom they are providing
production inputs.  The costs of monitoring and
recovering loans are nearly proportional to the
number of actors being monitored.  These costs
could be reduced by dealing with larger entities
such as farmer groups.  This process has just
begun in Zambia.  Strong farmer groups could not
only facilitate the acquisition of inputs on loan
but also provide market support, market
information, and extension support to its
members.  However, it will take great efforts to
help mobilize farmers into efficient and
commercially-oriented groups, and this may be a
useful role for donors and NGOs to support.
Yet these organizations take time to form and
mature, so they cannot be the only approach to
reducing the cost of loan recovery.  A second,
complementary approach, is for companies to
identify a core group of farmers in whom to
invest more aggressively to increase their
productivity and their area planted.  Additional
research is needed to identify this core group of
target farmers.  Available evidence suggests that
these farmers may already be larger and more
commercialized than the typical smallholder, butFSRP POLICY BRIEF  No.1
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have room for substantial improvements in yield
and/or area planted.  Companies would reach the
smaller farmers through effective farmer
organizations.
Sixth, the long-term trend of decreasing real
prices for cotton shows clearly the need for all
producing countries to obtain regular and
substantial increases in productivity throughout
the cotton chain, from input marketing through
to ginning and output marketing.  Public
investments in agronomic and seed breeding
research and extension services have been
important sources of farm productivity growth all
over the world.  But this creates daunting
challenges for Zambia, because its public sector is
not likely to devote much of its constrained
resources to cotton research and extension
systems.  This will impede the ability of the cotton
industry to remain internationally competitive over
the long run unless the industry develops
mechanisms to self-provision these investments.  
Self-financing mechanisms typically involve
charging a legally mandated levy on transactions
at some key point in the system.  Evaluation of
which point to administer the levy should consider
at least four criteria: 1) addressing firms’
temptations to minimize their contribution to the
levy and “free ride” on the contributions of other
firms, 2) ease of administration, 3) equity between
farmers and ginners, and 4) effects on trust among
all participants in the industry.  Administration of
a levy on exports and domestic sales of lint would
be easier to monitor and enforce than other
alternatives because there are fewer actors
involved at this stage compared to at other stages
in the marketing system.  Administrative
tractability would, in turn, make it easier to
enforce contributions to the research and
development (R&D) fund, thereby reducing the
free rider problem.  Charging the levy at the point
of sale of the lint will also increase the probability
that ginners will bear at least some portion of the
final cost, since it is unlikely that they will be able
to pass all of the cost down to farmers.  
Finally, a levy on lint sales will avoid further
complicating what is already a very confusing
pricing environment for farmers, thus avoiding the
creation of yet one more reason for farmers to
distrust ginners.
Seventh, additional complementary actions must
be taken to resolve the loan recovery and
productivity problems.  These include:
 reducing confusion and uncertainty
among farmers regarding the prices they
are paid, 
 agreeing on information sharing and
industry cooperation to reduce poaching,
 developing and proposing legislation to
give teeth to this industry strategy,
 agreeing on a self-financing approach to
fund cotton R&D,
 gaining government agreement to use
existing budgetary resources,
complemented by donor funds, in key
ways to increase the supply of capable
scientists who can contribute to improved
cotton technology,
 gaining government agreement and
support to educate farmers about the
long-run benefit of loan repayment,
 gaining government agreement to
consistently facilitate private sector
approaches to input supply,
 gaining government agreement and
support to improve quality control and
classification, particularly with regard to
reducing impurities from polypropylene
bags at the factory gate or before. 
KEY QUESTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED
AND RESOLVED IN DESIGNING THE
WAY FORWARD:  The Zambian cotton
industry must grapple with a number of key
questions as it designs collaborative approaches
to resolve its pressing problems.  This set of
questions is meant to be a starting point for
serious debate leading to effective solutions.
1.  Should stakeholders in the cotton industry and
government form a “cotton industry strategic
planning task force” for addressing the industry’s
problems and attempting to resolve them?  If so,
how would this subcommittee operate to ensure
legitimacy within the industry and adherence to
agreements made among its members?FSRP POLICY BRIEF  No.1
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2.  What should be the key elements in an industry
self-policing approach to solving the input use and
in-kind credit default problem?  The paper has
proposed:
a) That firms within the industry agree to
share information on individual
households and farmer groups to whom
they have extended in-kind loans, and the
status of those loans, then agree not to
purchase cotton from any farmer or
organization receiving credit from another
firm, or extend production credit to any
farmer or organization with debts to
another firm, and
b) That the industry prepare and propose to
government legislation that (i) defines the
conditions to be met for firms to be a legal
buyer of cotton; (ii) imposes penalties on
illegal or unlicensed buyers, (iii) imposes
penalties on firms that buy cotton from or
provide cotton financing to farmers with
outstanding debts to other cotton firms,
and (iv) imposes penalties on farmer
organizations (but not individual farmers)
who default on loans.
The paper emphasizes that this approach needs to
be primarily self-policed, and above all seek in a
positive way to attract and educate smallholders
through the benefits from more intensive input and
loan use, and repayment, with legal action being a
last recourse.
3.  How can ginning and other agribusiness
companies reduce the confusion and uncertainty
that producers currently feel about the prices they
receive for cotton?  The paper has proposed that
companies consider  two principles:
a) Establishing an industry-wide indicative
reference price to be announced every
year prior to planting.  This reference
price will serve to inform farmers of
projected market conditions at harvest.  It
would  be the reference price without
charges for any in-kind input credit that
firms may have provided,
b) Establishing an industry-wide procedure,
developed in consultation with farmers
and widely and frequently explained to
them, for calculating deductions from the
final revenue paid to farmers, based on
the type and quantity of inputs the farmer
has received on credit.
4.  How can cotton companies expand the
relatively  small group of smallholder farmers
with high cotton yields and relatively large areas
(1-5 ha.) devoted to cotton?  Should they place
primary emphasis on increasing yields among
low-yielding farmers with 1-5 hectares in cotton?
Or can the cotton companies make key
investments to help farmers with relatively higher
yields, but relatively small areas (less than 1 ha),
increase their area devoted to cotton?  Do cotton
companies or others have data at the individual
farmer level that would help answer such strategic
output expansion questions?
5. What is the best way to promote effective
farmer organizations? Should cotton firms create
and support farmer organizations themselves, or
simply facilitate NGO efforts in the area by
working with organizations that the NGOs help
create.
6.  Is a levy on sales of cotton lint the best way to
finance private cotton R&D?  If not, what
alternative mechanisms can the industry propose?
7. Who should manage the R&D fund?  Should it
be under the auspices of Cotton Development
Trust, or of a separate private sector organization
created for the purpose?
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